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Court Appointment of Attorneys
in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of
Uncompensated Legal Assistance
Whether an individual becomes a party to judicial proceeding involuntarily,
as a criminal or civil defendant, or voluntarily, as a civil plaintiff seeking redress
of an injury, the assistance of counsel will increase his chances for a favorable
disposition. When an impecunious litigant is unable to retain counsel, the ques-
tion arises of who must bear the burden created by the complexity of adjudica-
tion. Although the Supreme Court has been sympathetic to the need for counsel
in criminal cases,' an indigent litigant in civil cases often will be denied legal
assistance, and therefore will bear the burden himself.2 In other instances, the
public will assume this burden by procuring and compensating attorneys or pub-
lic defenders to represent litigants who cannot afford counsel.' Finally, mem-
bers of the legal profession themselves may be required to carry this burden by
representing the poor without compensation upon court appointment.'
The alternative that places the cost of representing impecunious litigants
upon individual attorneys, rather than upon the public or upon the litigants them-
selves, might at first glance seem the least equitable. Such a system runs con-
trary to general expectations that professionals be compensated for their
services.5 However, American courts have long exercised the authority, at least
in criminal cases, to compel attorneys to donate their services.6 Recent constitu-
tional challenges to this practice generally have been rejected, based either upon
the broad licensing authority of the states or upon the unique relationship of
attorneys to the courts. 7
This Note considers the constitutionality of requiring attorneys to provide
uncompensated legal assistance. While the discussion centers upon court appoint-
ment of attorneys in civil cases, the analysis is also applicable to criminal cases.
First, the Note outlines the demand for legal assistance to the poor and the types
of constitutional challenges usually raised to compelled representation. The Note
then examines the power of courts to compel attorneys to provide gratuitous
legal services, analyzing the traditional justifications advanced by courts to
shield compelled representation from constitutional scrutiny. Finding these justi-
fications unpersuasive, the Note proceeds to examine the consitutional challenges
to court appointment of attorneys, concluding that there is no constitutional bar
to compelling attorneys to render uncompensated legal assistance to poor liti-
gants in civil cases.
1. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text infra.
2. See Haines v. United States, 453 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1971); Ehrlich v. Van Epps, 428 F.2d
363 (7th Cir. 1970); Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969).
3. See note 18 and accompanying text infra.
4. See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
5. See note 26 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 8-12 and accompanying text infra.




Judicial appointment of attorneys to represent impecunious litigants without
compensation is not a new development. Colonials and early American statutes9
authorized courts to provide counsel at the request of indigents charged with
capital crimes.' 0 By the late nineteenth century most state courts had ceased to
depend on statutory authority, exercising the power to appoint counsel as part of
their inherent or constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law within the
state." Appointments during this period were still generally limited to criminal
cases in which the defendant faced a serious penalty. 2
In recent years the need for legal representation for the poor has increased.
Growing recognition of the importance of legal representation to obtaining a fair
outcome in criminal cases, 3 culminating in the Supreme Court's announcement
of a constitutional right to counsel in criminal prosecutions," has resulted in
greater demands upon lawyers' time. An increasing rate of criminal activity '"
and the requirement of representation at a greater number of stages of the crim-
inal justice process ' 6 have also contributed to this burden. In civil cases as well
8. E.g., 3 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 199 (Busch 1896); 1 Laws
of Delaware 1700-1797, at 66 (S. & J. Adams 1797); Laws of the Province of South Carolina
518-19 (Trott 1736), reprinted in 2 Earliest Printed Laws of South Carolina 1692-1734, at 40-41
(Cushing 1978). See generally W. Beaney, Right to Counsel in American Courts 14-18 (1955).
Pleading for hire was prohibited in seventeenth-century Massachusetts, Virginia, Connecticut,
and the Carolinas. See L. Friedman, A History of American Law 81 (1973). For example, the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties, Art. 26 (1641) provided: "Every man that findeth himselfe unfit to
plead his owne cause in any Court shall have Libertie to imploy any man against whom the Court
doth not except, to helpe him, Provided he give him noe fee or reward for his paines .... Even
where professional legal representation was permitted, litigants pleaded their own cause in the major-
ity of cases, a reflection of the colonial distrust of lawyers. See generally Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 826-32 (1975).
9. E.g., I Stat. 118 (1790); Laws of New Hampshire 247 (Melcher 1792); Acts of the
Nineteenth General Assembly of the State of New Jersey 1012, § 2 (1795). See generally W.
Beaney, supra note 8, at 14-18.
10. This right was extensive, inasmuch as virtually all felonies were capital crimes during this
period. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 94 (1st ed. 1769).
11. See, e.g., Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 62 (1860); Elam v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 348 (1873).
12. However, attorneys were also occasionally appointed in civil cases. See Louisiana v. Simp-
son, 38 La. Ann. 23, 25 (1886) (indicating that the court has power to appoint counsel to represent
an absentee in civil cases); House v. Whitis, 64 Tenn. 690, 692 (1875) (appointment of guardian ad
litem to minor party defendant in suit on contract for sale of land).
13. A line of Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), has expanded the indigent criminal defendant's right to counsel, recognizing that most lay-
men lack the skill and training necessary to protect their interests in the adversary setting. Therefore,
an attorney functioning as a skilled advocate is essential to obtain the rudiments of a fair trial.
14. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
15. From 1960 to 1971, the FBI's total crime index increased 196.9 percent. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1973, at 198, Table 3.51.
16. The sixth amendment right to counsel has been interpreted to guarantee the criminal defend-
ant representation by an attorney at a pretrial identification procedure, United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), and at a preliminary hearing, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). The right
to counsel on appeal has been held to be guaranteed by the equal protection clause. Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The fifth amendment has been interpreted to require the presence of
counsel, if requested, at a custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In
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there has been a growing acceptance of the notion that legal representation of
poor litigants results in fairer judicial determinations.17
Several methods have been used to satisfy this increasing need for legal
services for the poor. Legislatures have established organizations that employ
lawyers to represent the poor or have provided compensation for court-appointed
attorneys."8 In the absence of such legislative action, some courts have exer-
cised their inherent power to compel legislative expenditures for necessary judi-
cial operations, requiring localities to compensate court-appointed attorneys.' 9
addition, due process may require counsel at a parole revocation hearing, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972), or a probation revocation hearing, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
Other factors increasing the burden of compelled representation are the increasing complexity of
legal representation and the maldistribution of the burden among members of the bar as a result of
specialization in the profession. See, e.g., Abodeely v. County of Worcester, 227 N.E.2d 486,
488-89 (Mass. 1967).
17. Generally, courts acknowledge no duty to assign counsel to indigent civil litigants. See,
e.g., SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc., 481 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092 (1973);
Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971); Powell v. State, 19 Ariz. App. 377, 507 P.2d 989
(1973); Robinson v. Kaufman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 964 (1971); In re Waite, 143 Mont. 321, 389 P.2d 407 (1964). But in civil cases of particular
exigency courts have elevated the importance of counsel to constitutional dimension. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976) (indigent
prisoner defendant in suit for civil damages); In re Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974)
(involuntary termination of parental rights); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W.
Va. 1974) (same); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974) (involuntary
commitment proceeding).
In addition, commentators have identified civil cases in which access to legal assistance,
although not constitutionally guaranteed, would be of demonstrable benefit to an indigent litigant or
should be assured because of the extent of a litigant's potential deprivation. See, e.g., Botein,
Appointed Counsel for the Indigent Civil Defendant: A Constitutional Right Without a Judicial Rem-
edy?, 36 Brooklyn L. Rev. 368 (1970); McAninch, A Constitutional Right to Counsel for Divorce
Litigants, 14 J. Fam. L. 509 (1975-1976); O'Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases?
The Swiss Approach, 28 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1967); Popkin, The Effect of Representation in Nonadver-
sary Proeedings-A Study of Three Disability Programs, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 989 (1977); Silverstein,
Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2 Val. U.L.
Rev. 21 (1967); Note, Indigent Prisoner Defendants' Rights in Civil Litigation, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
1029 (1977). In many such cases, courts increasingly have exercised discretion to appoint counsel for
impecunious civil litigants. See, e.g., Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1977) (civil rights plaintiff); Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974) (child dependency
hearing); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (tort case); Massengale v. Commis-
sioner, 408 F.2d 1373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 923 (1969) (tax case); Ex rel.
D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980) (child dependency hearing); Danforth v. State Dep't of
Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973) (child custody); Madeline G. v. David R., 95 Misc. 2d
273, 407 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Fain. Ct. 1978) (paternity suit); Farrell v. Farrell, 55 A.D.2d 586, 390
N.Y.S.2d 87 (1976) (mem.) (suit for divorce); Jacox v. Jacox, 43 A.D.2d 716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 435
(1974) (matrimonial action).
18. See, e.g., Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970); N.Y. Jud. Law § 35(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.Y.
County Law §§ 722 to 722-f (McKinney Supp. 1980) (criminal, habeas corpus and civil retention
matters); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 245, 248, 261, 262 (McKinney 1975) (specified family court matters).
19. See, e.g., Knox County Council v. State ex rel McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405
(1940); Honore v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 466 P.2d 485 (Wash. 1970) (en
banc); cf. Allison v. Wilson, 277 F. Supp. 271, 275 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (dictum) (power to appoint
counsel to an indigent incarcerated plaintiff in a civil action implies authority to commit federal funds
to underwrite necessary expenditures).
Courts have generally regarded as inherent in the nature of judicial institutions a power to
procure personnel, buildings, and supplies where necessary to the functioning of the courts. See,
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Others have attempted to force legislative action by relieving attorneys of their
obligation to accept uncompensated court appointments."0 Some courts, how-
ever, have continued to appoint attorneys without compensation in both criminal
and civil cases.2 In addition, several proposals have recently been advanced to
compel members of the bar to devote a minimum number of hours to public
service such as the representation of impecunious clients.22 If adopted, these
e.g., Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971) (authority to
hire law clerks and judicial assistants), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972). See generally Note,
Protective Orders Against the Press and the Inherent Powers of the Courts, 87 Yale L.J. 342, 348-62
(1977).
Some courts believe that their inherent power does not extend as far as compelling compensation
of court-appointed attorneys. See, e.g., Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1979); Board of
Supervisors v. Bailey, 236 So. 2d 420 (Miss. 1970); Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359
N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1974). Other courts, while acknowledging their power to appropriate ex-
penditures for this purpose, have expressed a willingness to exercise that power only in extreme
cases. See, e.g., People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 I11. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966); State v.
Second Judicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 241, 453 P.2d 421 (1969) (out-of-pocket expenses incurred by
appointed counsel). But see Daines v. Markoff, 555 P.2d 490 (Nev. 1976).
An exercise of inherent judicial power to compel legislative compensation of appointed attorneys
would seem the most satisfactory solution from the point of view of indigent litigants. Indigent
litigants would gain access to legal assistance not only when constitutionally or statutorily required,
but whenever the court deems it required by fairness. See Caston v. Sears. Roebuck & Co..
556 F.2d 1305, 1308-10 (5th Cir. 1977) (guidelines for appointment of counsel in civil rights
cases).
Courts finding no inherent power to compensate attorneys or unwilling to exercise their inherent
power have given broad interpretations to statutes authorizing payment of expenses incident to judi-
cial administration so as to find statutory authorization for the compensation of appointed attorneys.
See, e.g., Ex rel. D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); Abodeely v. County of Worcester, 352
Mass. 719, 1227 N.E.2d 486 (1967); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
Courts have also interpreted statutes authorizing appointment of counsel to imply legislative
intent to compensate appointed attorneys. See, e.g., Luke v. County of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App.
2d 495, 74 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1969).
20. See, e.g., State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1971) (en banc); State ex rel. Partain v.
Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1976).
By refusing to compel representation upon court appointment, courts shift to legislatures the
burden of developing and financing a system for providing legal services to indigent criminal defend-
ants whose right to counsel is of constitutional dimension. Without counsel or an effective waiver of
counsel, the defendant's conviction would be constitutionally defective; therefore, the legislature is
put to the choice of either financing legal representation or precluding the state from prosecuting
criminal cases. See Johnson v. City Comm'n, 272 N.W.2d 97, 101 (S.D. 1978). On the other hand,
the legislature is not compelled to finance legal assistance for indigents to whom there is no constitu-
tional guarantee of counsel. Therefore, indigent litigants in civil cases may be denied assistance
absent the largesse of the legislature or of private attorneys.
21. See, e.g., Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973);
Moss v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.R.D. 624 (E.D. Va. 1979); Dade County v. McCrary,
260 So. 2d 543 (Fla. App. 1972); Crist v. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 135 N.J.
Super. 573, 343 A.2d 815 (App. Div. 1975); In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 330
N.E.2d 53 (1975); Penrod v. Cupp, 587 P.2d 96 (Or. 1978).
22. See, e.g., ABA Proposed Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1 (would require an attor-
ney to perform "unpaid public interest legal service," including "activities for improving the law,
the legal system, or the legal profession, or by providing professional services to persons of limited
means or to public service groups or organizations"); Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Toward a Mandatory Contribution of Public Service Practice by Every Lawyer: Recommenda-
tions and Report of the Special Committee on the Lawyer's Pro Bono Obligations (1980) [hereinafter
cited as New York City Bar Proposal].
These proposals have not been endorsed by the membership of the bar associations. See 67
A.B.A.J. 33 (1981). The rules of the organized bar are susceptible to challenge not only on constitu-
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proposals would have the same force as court appointments," and would impose
still more compulsory service requirements upon attorneys.
Lawyers have never passively accepted judicial directives to represent
clients without compensation. Since the mid-nineteenth century, attorneys have
raised constitutional challenges to court appointments. 4 Until recently, how-
ever, such challenges were almost always rejected., While conceding that a
state generally cannot compel uncompensated personal service from individuals
in the community,' early decisions distinguished legal representation from other
types of personal service. Representation of indigents was viewed alternatively
as a duty that could logically be imposed on attorneys as "officers of the court"
tional grounds, but also under federal antitrust law. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975). Statutory challenges to compulsory gratuitous legal assistance fall outside the scope of this
Note.
23. For example, the New York City Bar Proposal, supra note 22, at 22-25, would be im-
plemented by the adoption of a Disciplinary Rule in each Appellate Division, upon the recommenda-
tion of the Bar. The Rule would provide that "[elvery lawyer shall devote a significant portion of his
or her professional time each year to public service practice." Id. at 23.
24. Generally lawyers claimed that their services could not be taken without compensation. See
Hall v. Washington, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850).
Early decisions also considered claims for compensation based on an implied or quasi-
contractual relationship between the attorney and the state or local government. For example, in
Whicher v. Cedar County, I Greene 217 (Iowa 1848), an Iowa attorney assigned under a state statute
to represent an indigent criminal defendant sued the county for remuneration. The attorney argued
that as an "officer of the court" he was not free to refuse the court's assignment, but that the
obligation to preserve the life and liberty of indigents by assuring them a defense in criminal cases
attached to the community at large, which must therefore compensate members of the bar for their
services. A majority of the court denied compensation, however, adopting the county's argument that
the statute authorizing an appointment of counsel to indigent defendants did not impose a duty on
any member of the bar to accept the appointment, but relied upon an attorney to serve either gra-
tuitously as a "friend of the court" or with the hope of recovering his fee from the defendant.
Therefore, attorneys had no right to be reimbursed for their services in the absence of a statute
providing for compensation.
See also Bacon v. County of Wayne, I Mann. 461 (Mich. 1850); Wayne County v. Waller, 90
Pa. 99, 35 Am. Rep. 636 (1879); Case v. Shawnee County, 4 Kan. 511, 96 Am. Dec. 190 (1868).
25. Rare decisions in which courts adopted a requirement that court-appointed attorneys be
compensated include Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854) (requiring compensation under a state consti-
tutional provision which states that "no man's particular services shall be demanded without just
compensation"); Hall v. Washington, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850); Dane County v. Smith, 13 Wis.
585, 80 Am. Dec. 754 (1861); Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274 (1859). But see Woodbury
County v. Anderson, 164 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1969) (partial compensation not unconstitutional);
Green Lake County v. Waupaca County, 113 Wis. 425, 89 N.W. 549 (1902) (same).
Most early cases rejecting attorneys' claims stressed the courts' lack of inherent power to com-
pel the expenditure of public funds to compensate attorneys appointed to represent indigent litigants.
See, e.g., Nabb v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 173 (1864); Presby v. Klickitat County, 5 Wash. 329, 31
P. 876 (1892); State v. Simmons, 43 La. Ann. 991, 10 So. 382 (1891); Johnson v. Whiteside
County, 110 Il. 22 (1884); Case v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 Kan. 511 (1868). Some courts
indicated that but for this limitation on the court's power, compensation would be provided. See,
e.g., Pardee v. Salt Lake County, 39 Utah 482, 118 P. 122 (1911).
26. See House v. Whitis, 64 Tenn. 690, 692 (1875) ("The principle of the organic law which
forbids the demand of any man's particular services without just compensation has no application to
such a case."). Some courts held that the failure of the government to compensate appointed attor-
neys was not a departure from this general rule, because attorneys might look to the future ability of
theit clients for compensation. See, e.g., Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 62, 63 (1860). House v.
Whitis, 64 Tenn. 690, 692 (1875).
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subject to the court's authority;27 an historically recognized obligation to which
attorneys impliedly consent upon accepting the license to practice law; 28 or a
duty correlative to reciprocal rights and privileges conferred on licensed
attorneys. 9
In recent years the increase in compulsory legal service has precipitated a
renewal of constitutional challenges to the obligation to represent the poor.30
Most courts continue to reject constitutional challenges to court assignments,
relying on the century-old conception of the peculiar status of legal
representation.3 For example, in United States v. Dillon,32 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld the appointment of an attorney against a constitu-
tional challenge because the attorney "performs an obligation imposed upon him
by the ancient traditions of his profession and as an officer of the court assisting
the court in the administration of justice." 33 The court considered the duty to
accept an appointment to be "a condition under which lawyers are licensed to
practice" and to which "[a]n applicant for admission to practice law may justly
be deemed [to have consented]." '
Nevertheless, several courts have held that the appointment of unpaid
lawyers to represent indigent litigants is impermissible as a constitutional matter,
at least in civil cases.35 Appointments have been found unconstitutional as a
27. See, e.g., Arkansas County v. Freeman & Johnson, 31 Ark. 266, 267 (1876); Vise v.
County of Hamilton, 19 Ill. 78, 79 (1857); Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99, 104 (1879).
28. See, e.g., Johnson v. Whiteside County, 110 Ill. 22, 25 (1884).
29. See, e.g., Johnson v. Whiteside County, 110 I11. 22, 25 (1884); Arkansas County v. Free-
man & Johnson, 31 Ark. 266 (1876); Vise v. County of Hamilton, 19 I11. 78, 79 (1857).
30. In addition to suits challenging court appointments, commentators have increasingly been
questioning the practice on both constitutional and institutional grounds. See Williams & Bost, The
Assigned Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude?, 42 Miss. L.J. 32 (1971); Hunter, Slave Labor
in the Courts-A Suggested Solution, 74 Case & Comment 3 (July-Aug. 1969); Ervin, Uncompen-
sated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J. 435 (1963); Note, The
Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J.
710 (1972); Note, Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to Compensated Counsel, 52
Comell L.Q. 433 (1967); Note, 55 Ky. L.J. 707 (1967). See also Note, Dollars and Sense of an
Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249 (1970).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d, 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1978 (1966); Weiner v. Fulton County, 148 S.E.2d 143, 147-48, 113 Ga. App. 343, (Hall, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24,
28-29, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1966); State v. Clifton, 172 So. 2d 657, 667 (La. 1965); State v.
Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 410, 217 A.2d 441, 447 (1966) (The duty of uncompensated service is "an
incident of the license to practice law."); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 561-62, 133 P.2d
325, 331 (1943). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) ("Attorneys are officers of
the court, and are bound to render service when required by such an appointment.").
32. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
33. Id. at 636.
34. Id. at 635.
35. See, e.g., In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings,
475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979); Davison v. Joseph Home & Co., 265 F. Supp. 750, 752 (W.D.
Pa. 1967) (dictum) (citing United States v. Leser, 233 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. Cal. 1964)); Bedford v.
Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968); Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359
N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 372 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1975); cf. Allison v. Wilson, 277 F.
Supp. 271, 274 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (court cannot compel attorney to serve indigent client in frivolous
action). See also Note, Indigents' Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 Geo. L.J. 113,
138-39 (1977). But see Note, The Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 Fordham L.
Rev. 989, 1004-06 (1975).
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violation of due process, as a taking of property by the government without just
compensation, and as an involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth
amendment.
In Bedford v. Salt Lake City,16 the Supreme Court of Utah relied on the fifth
amendment's prohibition against uncompensated takings to invalidate a statute
authorizing appointment of counsel to represent indigents in involuntary hospital-
ization proceedings. The court found that personal services are a form of prop-
erty protected by the takings clause. Therefore, the statutory requirement that
attorneys donate legal services constituted an uncompensated taking of private
property37
In Menin v. Menin,38 a New York state trial court found that the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the imposition on the right to
practice law of conditions not reasonably related to an attorney's fitness to prac-
tice law. The court held that a court appointment of a lawyer to render gratuitous
service to indigent litigants in a divorce action did not meet this test and was
therefore unconstitutional. 39
Most recently, in Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII
Proceedings,' a federal district court in Alabama declined to assign counsel to
civil rights plaintiffs on the ground that appointment of counsel in civil cases
imposes upon the attorney an involuntary servitude prohibited by the thirteenth
amendment. In the court's view, an obligation to represent indigent civil liti-
gants, unlike the duty to defend indigents in criminal cases, did not fall within
any exception to the thirteenth amendment prohibition because it was neither an
obligation undertaken commensurate with the privilege to practice law nor was it
a duty owed to the state."
Before evaluating these constitutional challenges, the Note discusses the
power of courts to appoint attorneys to represent indigents in civil cases.
I. JUDICIAL POWER TO COMPEL GRATurrous
REPRESENTATION BY ATrORNEYS
It has long been recognized that the states possess broad authority to reg-
ulate the legal profession because "lawyers are essential to the primary gov-
ernmental function of administering justice." 42 The breadth of this power is
apparent in the wide sweep of the American Bar Association's Code of Profes-
36. 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968). See also Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487
(D. Ore. 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). But see
Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
37. 22 Utah 2d at 14-15, 447 P.2d at 194-95 (1968).
38. 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 48 App. Div. 2d 904, 372
N.Y.S.2d 985 (1975).
39. Id. at 292-93, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 728-30.
40. 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979), appeal docketed sub nom. In re Five Applicants, No.
79-3863 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 1979).
41. Id. at 89-90.
42. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
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sional Responsibility, which has been adopted by many states. 3 The Code's
provisions govern advertising," fees, 5 confidentiality of client information," con-
flicts of interest,47 and conduct during trials."8 In almost all states, whether by
constitutional provision, 9 statute,' or judicial decision,5 this regulatory power is
vested in the state courts. 2
The appointment of counsel in both civil and criminal cases furthers the
administration of justice by enhancing the fairness of judicial proceedings.53
Therefore, it is within the state's broad power. This view is supported by many
decisions invoking the courts' regulatory authority to justify the appointment of
counsel - and by several statutes permitting appointment of counsel.5
State regulation of attorneys, like all state regulatory power, is subject to
limits imposed by the federal constitution.5 6 Many courts, however, have found
appointments of attorneys to represent indigents immune from constitutional
scrutiny, either because attorneys are "officers of the court" obligated to serve
upon court appointment or because such a condition may permissibly be imposed
upon the attorney's license to practice law. Analysis of the two doctrines indi-
cates that they cannot be invoked to override constitutional prohibitions. Govern-
ment power over attorneys is limited by applicable constitutional requirements.
A. "Officer of the Court"
The modern American attorney is often described as an "officer of the
court." 57 Many courts have relied upon this status in requiring attorneys to
43. In re Hallett, 58 I11. 2d 239, 249, 319 N.E.2d 48, 54 (1974); State v. Rimar, Inc., 462 Pa.
138, 145, 338 A.2d 584, 587 (Pa. 1975); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 14 app. (Vernon Supp.
1980).
44. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rules 2-100, 2-101.
45. Id., Disciplinary Rules 2-106, 2-107.
46. Id., Disciplinary Rule 4-101.
47. Id., Disciplinary Rules 5-101 to 5-107.
48. Id., Disciplinary Rules 7-101 to 7-110.
49. See, e.g., N.J. Const. art.VI, § II, 3.
50. See, e.g., N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(2) (McKinney 1976).
51. See, e.g., Mrotek v. Nair, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 313, 317-18, 231 A.2d 95, 99 (1967); Smith
v. Brock, 532 P.2d 843, 847 (Okla. 1975).
52. Some courts have viewed legislative actions resting on their regulatory power as restricting
their freedom to act. See State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966). Thus, where the
legislature has stated that attorneys may only be "requested to represent indigents," these courts
have found themselves denied power to compel attorneys to accept appointments. See, e.g., Purcell
v. Johnston, 307 F. Supp. 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Wagner v. Maroney, 263 F. Supp. 377, 378
(W.D. Pa. 1967); Rhodes v. Houston, 258 F. Supp. 546, 579 (D. Neb. 1966), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1309
(8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1049 (1970); Diaz v. Chatterton, 229 F. Supp. 19, 23 (S.D.
Cal. 1964).
53. There is no basis for distinguishing appointments in criminal cases from those in civil cases.
In each situation, the fairness of the proceeding is promoted by the involvement of the attorney.
54. See note 21 supra.
55. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law 1102(a) (McKinney
1976); 11. Ann. Stat. ch. 33, § 5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27403 (1962).
56. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (freedom of speech); Baird v. State Bar,
401 U.S. 1 (1971) (freedom of association); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (privilege
against self-incrimination).
57. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 723 (1973); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 73 (1932); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 371 (1867).
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carry out court appointments. 8 In their view, lawyers may permissibly be sub-
ject to an otherwise unconstitutional burden because of the courts' supervisory
authority. An examination of the officer of the court doctrine, however, indicates
that it is not applicable to American attorneys.
In the English legal system lawyers were classified as either "attorneys" or
"barristers." Attorneys, who were not permitted to plead and defend suits for
clients, were considered officers of the court. Attorneys performed ministerial
duties for the courts, were admitted to practice by a judge, and were subject to
the judge's discipline, just as were members of the court clerical staff.5 9 In
contrast, English barristers, who pleaded and defended lawsuits, were admitted
to practice by self-regulating professional organizations, the Inns of Court."
They were never considered officers of the court." Banisters were obligated to
accept court appointments to represent the poor62 because they were required, as
citizens, to defer to the commands of the King's courts, not because of their
relationship to the courts. 3
Clearly the officer of the court doctrine cannot be used to support court-
compelled representation by American lawyers. The doctrine did not apply to
banisters, the English lawyers who most closely resemble American litigators,
and it was never used to support compelled legal representation. The inapplica-
bility of this doctrine to American attorneys is bolstered by the position of
lawyers in the early American legal system.
The early practice of law in this country was characterized by low standards
for admission and by scant judicial control over practitioners. Lawyers in the
Colonies neither performed the ministerial functions nor maintained the rela-
58. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966); Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858
(1966); State v. Clifton, 247 La. 495, 172 So. 2d 657 (1965); Scott v. State, 216 Tenn. 375, 392
S.W.2d 681 (1965). See also note 27 and accompanying text supra.
59. See 6 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 435-58 (1924).
60. The organization of a guild of sergeants-of-law, the precursors of barristers, developed
during the fourteenth century. Selected by the chief justice of the Common Pleas, the sergeants were
commanded to serve by the chancellor under the threat of heavy penalty, and could only be dis-
charged by special royal writ. In addition to lucrative fees and a monopoly of practice at the Court of
Common Pleas, the sergeants enjoyed rank equal with knights, freedom from suit except in their own
court, and privileges to levy fines, attend Parliament, and try petitions. 2 W. Holdsworth, A History
of English Law 484-93 (3d ed. 1923).
61. See Bradshaw, Attorneys as Officers of the Court, 46 N.Y.S.B.J. 351, 351-56 (1974); 6
W. Holdsworth, supra note 59, at 435-58 (1924).
62. See Trevanion v. Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1535 (K.B. 1702); Anonymous v. Scroggs, 89
Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B. 1674) ("[Iff the Court should assign [a sergeant] to be counsel, he ought to
attend; and if he refuse ... we would not hear him, nay, we would make bold to commit him."); 2
W. Holdsworth, supra note 60, at 494 n.4 (citing examples from fifteenth century Year Books).
Even when representing nonimpecunious clients, the sergeant was thought to practice gratis, for
honor only, and his fee was viewed not as a salary but as a mere gratuity, a tradition that Professor
Lewis traces to Roman law. 3 W. Lewis, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
1046-47 & n.27 (1922).
63. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 139-42 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). See also
Edwards v. United States, 103 U.S. 471, 473 (1880). Just as there was no independent bar in
England until the end of the eighteenth century, likewise there was no independent judiciary. See




tionship to the judiciary associated with attorneys in England.' The elevation of
law to its professional status after the Civil War resulted not from the courts'
assumption of regulatory power over lawyers, but from the emergence of self-
regulating bar associations nationwide.6" Thus the close relationship between
lawyer and court, which had been at the root of the English concept of an"officer of the court," was never present in the United States.
Contemporary judicial decisions, while repeatedly describing attorneys as
officers of the court, also recognize that the British model can not properly be
applied to the American legal system. For example, in In re Griffiths,' the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that because of the status of attorneys as
officers of the court citizenship could be made a condition of admission to the
bar. The Court found that the position of lawyers is not like that of clerks,
marshals, bailiffs, or other public officials under the courts' supervision-the
position of officers of the court in Britain. Therefore, the Griffiths Court found
no reason to consider whether a citizenship requirement could constitutionally be
imposed upon public officials. 67 American lawyers are instead viewed as func-
tioning "in a three-fold capacity, as self-employed businessmen .... as trusted
agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solu-
tion to disputes." 6 The courts have thus drawn a distinction between lawyers and
the ministerial agents of the judiciary who are officers of the court,' rendering
64. Although formally receiving the English common law, the Colonies departed radically from
the English tradition in structuring legal services. See generally R. Pound., The Lawyer from Antiq-
uity to Modem Times (1953). Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries legislation hostile
to the practice of law was enacted in the Colonies. When the Colonies did establish systems of
admission to the practice of law in the early eighteenth century, most rejected the traditional English
system by which each court admitted attorneys to practice before it. Instead, an attorney admitted by
a court or by the royal governor was permitted to practice before any of the courts of the colony.
Whatever continuity existed between the legal profession in the colonies and its English counter-
part dissolved after the American revolution. Decentralization and deprofessionalization of the prac-
tice of law was characterized by low standards for admission to practice. See, e.g., Mass. Act of
March 6, 1790, 1 Laws of Massachusetts 1780-1807 at 493. Lack of judicial control over legal
practitioners resulted from the combined effects of political hostility toward English institutions,
geographical and economic conditions after the war, and a Jeffersonian distrust of professionalism as
antithetical to democratic ideals. The independent professional status of attorneys was abolished in
many states by the mid-nineteenth century. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 177, § 2 (1842)
("[a]ny citizen of the age of twenty one years, of good moral character, on application to the
Supreme Court, shall be admitted to practice as an attorney"); 1843 Me. Acts ch. 12; Wis. Rev.
Stat. ch. 87, § 26 (1849); Const. Ind. 1851, art. 7, § 21.
Most other states maintained only minimal requirements as to education and training of lawyers.
The states' unwillingness to structure the legal profession in accordance with the English tradition
reflected a fear that specialization and requirements of special training for particular professions
would establish an exclusive privileged class. See A. Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the
Law 85-86 (1921).
65. See R. Pound, supra note 64, at 353, 355.
66. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
67. Id. at 727-29. See also Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 520 (1967) (Fortas, J., concur-
ring).
68. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961). See also Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193,
193-204 (1979). As assistants to the court, attorneys are subject to a variety of obligations imposed
pursuant to the courts' regulatory power. See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra. This power is, of
course, subject to constitutional limitations. Id.
69. Compare Mathews v. Weber, 423 US. 261, 266-68 (1976) (magistrates are "officers of the
court" under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)), North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 602
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the officer of the court doctrine inapplicable to American attorneys. The doctrine
therefore cannot be used to uphold the authority of the judiciary to impose other-
wise unconstitutional burdens upon attorneys.
B. Conditions on Occupational Licensing
Courts have also upheld the obligation to accept court appointments as a
condition permissibly imposed upon the attorney's license to practice law.70 In
this view, the practice of a profession is a privilege granted by the state, which
the state is under no obligation to bestow and which therefore may be unilat-
erally revoked. A license to practice law may be lawfully withheld by the state
except upon the conditions it imposes, including conditions that would otherwise
violate the constitutional rights of attorneys. 7  Therefore, the duty to represent
indigents, or any other obligation, could permissibly be imposed upon lawyers.
The notion that access to government benefits may be conditioned upon the
relinquishment of constitutional rights was dominant during the nineteenth
century,' when the issue of the constitutionality of court appointment of attor-
neys first arose. In the past two decades, however, it has been soundly rejected
by the Supreme Court.
Recalling the Lochner 73 era doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," 74 the
Court has repeatedly affirmed that constitutional rights "may [not] be infringed
(1975) (clerks of the court), and Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052, 1055 & n.3 (1972) (bailiff)
(citing Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966)), with Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193,
199-200 & n. 19 (1979) (office of appointed defense counsel, unlike that of prosecutor or judge, does
not give rise to federal officer immunity), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)
(attorneys as "officers of the court" are not "public officials" for purposes of defamation rule of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S.
538, 554 n.25 (1972) (although attorneys are formally "officers of the court," state garnishment
process was not a state court proceeding for 28 U.S.C. § 2283 purposes, since attorneys, who had
complete discretion to issue a writ, were not proceeding under a court's supervision), and Cammer v.
United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956) (unlike marshals, bailiffs, court clerks, or judges, attorneys
are not "officers of the court" within meaning of a federal summary contempt statute).
70. See, e.g., Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Dillon,
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488
(Alaska 1966); Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 958 (1966). See also note 28 and accompanying text supra.
71. Cf. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (upholding suspension of physi-
cian's license to practice medicine).
72. For example, Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), upheld an ordinance prohibiting
public speaking in Boston Commons without a license. The Court reasoned that ownership of the
Commons allowed the city to withhold access completely; therefore, the city legitimately could per-
mit access subject to any conditions, including limits on the exercise of first amendment rights. See
also McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892) (opin-
ion of Holmes, C.J.) (upholding a ban on police participation in political activities) ("The petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man. 1).
73. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
74. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 598 (1926) ("[A]
state is without power to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a condition for granting a priv-
ilege."). See generally Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum. L.
Rev. 321 (1935); Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 879 (1929).
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by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." 7 Several
of these decisions struck down state-imposed conditions on the license to prac-
tice law that violated lawyers' constitutional rights. For example, in Spevack v.
Klein"8 a New York attorney was disbarred for failing to cooperate with a judi-
cial inquiry. Petitioner challenged his disbarment for professional misconduct on
the ground that his failure to produce financial records and to testify was an
exercise of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The Court up-
held his challenge, reasoning that the government's power to license attorneys
does not carry with it the power to deny or to limit their fifth amendment
rights."
Conditions on the license to practice law have also been struck down when
inconsistent with due process, 78 with the first amendment rights of free speech79
or free association,' or with the right to equal protection.' These cases estab-
lish the clear principle that the license to practice law may not be conditioned on
an attorney's relinquishment of constitutional rights.
II. CONsTrruTONAL CHALLENGES TO COMPELLED REPRESENTATION
A. Due Process
The precipitous decline of substantive due process since the 1930's has had
its greatest impact on federal judicial review of state regulation of businesses and
professions.8 2  Although state laws in the economics area were formerly subject
to intense scrutiny under the due process clause," it is now "enough that there is
an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."" Of course, the evil
sought to be corrected or the goal sought to be advanced must be a proper object
of state legislation.85
75. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (unemployment compensation may not be
conditioned on the beneficiary's waiver of her right under the first amendment free exercise clause to
decline for religious reasons to work on Saturdays); see, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,
500 (1967); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965). See generally Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968);
Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 144 (1968).
76. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
77. Id. at 516 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 520 (Fortas, J., concurring).
78. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Ex-
aminers, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
79. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
80. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
81. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
82. See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). See gener-
ally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 8.5-.7, 15.14 (1978); McCloskey, Economic Due
Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 34. But see
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (striking Civil Service Commissions' exclusion of
noncitizens under due process); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
83. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 82, §§ 8.2-.4.
84. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).




This is the test applied to state regulation of the legal profession. 6 For
example, in Lathrop v. Donohue,87 the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a
requirement that all lawyers practicing in Wisconsin pay annual dues to the state
bar. While focusing for the most part on plaintiff's claim that his right of free
association had been infringed, the Court did note that the dues requirement
satisfied due process inasmuch as it had a reasonable relationship to the legiti-
mate state policy of improving legal services.8
Under this standard, court appointment of attorneys to represent indigents
without compensation should be upheld against a due process challenge. The
appointments seek to further a policy of improving legal services to the poor.
This is certainly a legitimate state policy; it is basically the same one endorsed in
Lathrop. 9 The means of achieving the goal is also reasonable: the court acts
directly to provide legal services to the poor. Thus the court's conclusion in
Menin v. Menin ' that due process forbids the appointment of attorneys in civil
cases is contrary to the applicable precedents.
B. Involuntary Servitude
The thirteenth amendment 9' bars both "slavery" and "involuntary servi-
tude" within the United States. In addition to this self-executing prohibition, the
86. The due process clause does impose more substantial constraints upon the criteria that a
state may use in regulating admission to the bar. The Supreme Court has stated that "any qualifica-
tion must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law."
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). See also In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S.
82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). The attorney's obligation to accept court
appointments, however, is not a condition upon his admission to the bar; rather, it is a regulation of
the practice of law, and the less stringent due process test applies.
Even under the stricter standard, court compelled representation arguably satisfies due process.
Public-spiritedness has traditionally been considered an element of the good moral character neces-
sary to practice law. A requirement of public interest is embodied in various provisions of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Canon 2 (The profession has a "duty to make legal
counsel available."); Ethical Consideration 2-25 ("Every lawyer, regardless of professional promi-
nence or professional workload, should find the time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.");
Canon 8 (Every lawyer "should assist in improving the legal system.").
That a lawyer's insensitivity to the public interest might justify the revocation of a license to
practice was suggested by Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117
(1961), which upheld the disbarment of an attorney for declining to answer questions advanced by a
New York court investigating professional misconduct. Justice Harlan emphasized that a duty to
cooperate in an investigation into professional malfeasance is "rationally" related to the state in-
terest, justified by the exposure of attorneys to "special opportunities for deleterious conduct," in"preventive certainty" regarding the ethical conduct of members of the bar. Id. at 126-27. He
suggested in addition, however, that an attorney should be interested both in the effective functioning
of the judicial process and in the public standing of the legal profession, so that a lawyer's failure to
cooperate in an investigation into professional misconduct might reflect an absence of the degree of
concern for judicial administration that the state may reasonably require of its attorneys. Id. at 127.
87. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
88. Id. at 843. The test has been applied by other courts as well. See Person v. Association of
the Bar, 554 F.2d 534, 538-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
89. It certainly could not be argued that state-financed programs to provide civil representation
to the poor violate due process, and that they are justified by the same state policy.
90. 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 48 App. Div. 2d 904, 372
N.Y.S.2d 985 (1975). See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
91. The thirteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
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amendment gives Congress legislative power to enforce its commands. 92
Although the amendment was ratified during the Civil War with the object of
abolishing slavery, 93 the scope of Congress's enforcement power has been inter-
preted in recent years to encompass a broad range of discriminatory activities. 9
In contrast, the amendment's self-executing prohibition has been limited in
its application by the Supreme Court to instances in which state criminal statutes
create a risk of imprisonment for breach of an employment contract.5 Under
this construction of the thirteenth amendment, it seems unlikely that court
appointment of attorneys would be undermined. The attorney who refuses to
represent an indigent risks losing only his right to practice law; he is not
threatened with prison.9 Nevertheless, broad statements by the Supreme Court
indicate that the ban on involuntary servitude may extend beyond traditional
conceptions of slavery and peonage.
For example, Pollock v. Williams 9O attributed to the thirteenth amendment
the intent not only to abolish slavery, but also to "maintain a system of com-
pletely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States." 9 In Nine Ap-
plications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings,9 a federal dis-
trict court relied on generalizations such as this one, as well as on the "plain
meaning" of the amendment, in characterizing the appointment of an attorney to
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
92. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1976).
93. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
94. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). See generally Buchanan,
The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (1974).
95. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). See generally Misner & Clough, Arrestees as Informants:
A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 713 (1977); Note, The Reach of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 299 (1947).
96. At English common law an attorney might indeed face imprisonment for refusal to serve
upon court appointment. See Anonymous v. Scroggs, 89 Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B. 1674). However,
American courts exercising their contempt power when an attorney refuses to accept or proceed
under an appointment generally do not impose imprisonment as a punishment, choosing at most to
disbar the attorney. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 324 So. 2d 341 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975); Williams
v. State, 283 So. 2d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Archie v. State, 92 Nev. 746, 557 P.2d 1153
(1976); State v. Frankel, 119 N.J. Super. 579, 293 A.2d 196 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973); State v. Corey, 117 N.J. Super. 296, 284 A.2d 395 (1971); Matter of Hunoval, 247 S.E.2d
230 (N.C. 1979); State ex rel. Supreme Court v. Anderson, 239 Or. 362, 397 P.2d 838 (1964);
Schoolfield v. Darwin, 182 Tenn. 192, 185 S.W.2d 509 (1945). But see Ex parte Droby, 369
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (granting habeas corpus petitions of two attorneys on ground
that judgments of contempt violated due process).
97. 322 U.S. 4 (1944). In Pollock, the Court considered a provision making a person's failure
to perform under an agreement to render services prima facie evidence of intent to defraud for
purposes of a Florida statute criminalizing fraudulent procurement of an advance. The provision was
held unconstitutional since it created a peonage: the defendant was liable for criminal sanctions if he
did not work, whether or not his intent was in fact fraudulent.
98. Id. at 17. See also Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906).
99. 475 F. Supp. 87, 88-89 (N.D. Ala. 1979), appeal docketed sub. nom. In re Five Appli-
cants, No. 79-3863 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 1979). See also United States v. Leser, 233 F. Supp. 535,
538 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (dictum); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968).
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indigent civil rights plaintiffs as the creation of an involuntary servitude. The
correctness of this conclusion, however, is doubtful.
Traditionally, courts faced with the question of whether service was "in-
voluntary" have looked to the threatened consequences of a refusal to serve,1°°
rather than to the voluntariness of the initial agreement to work ' 0 or to the actual
mental state of the servitor at the time of service. 0 , The possibility of civil
damages for breach of an employment contract is not so harsh as to render a
performance of labor involuntary; in contrast, labor is involuntary when, as in
the case,of peonage, "law or force compels performance." 101 In rare instances
courts have been required to decide whether threatened consequences of a refusal
to provide services short of force or confinement are coercive enough to render a
servitude "involuntary."
In United States v. Shackney 104 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was asked to decide whether labor performed under threat of deportation was
involuntary. Shackney, a chicken farmer, was charged under a federal criminal
statute with subjecting Mexican employees to involuntary servitude by threaten-
ing to have them deported if they refused to work.0 5 The government argued
that involuntary servitude included any willful procurement of services by
duress. The government's interpretation would have barred employment under
threats to blackball an employee in the industry, to reveal a crime to the police,
or even to prevent the employee's son from obtaining admission to a desirable
college.101 The court rejected the government's broad reading, and held that
"the statute applies only to service compelled by law, by force or by threat of
continued confinement." 101 Therefore, the threat of deportation, at least where
the employee did not anticipate violence or confinement upon return to the coun-
try of his origin, was not sufficiently coercive to make labor "involuntary" for
the purposes of the Federal criminal statute.
Under the Second Circuit's reading, the threatened loss of employment
opportunities similarly would not render a servitude involuntary. Thus, in Flood
v. Kuhn 's the court relied on Shackney, holding that the baseball reserve system
100. The consequences, such as force or imprisonment, that establish "involuntariness" need
not actually be imposed. The threat of force or imprisonment, at least if reasonably capable of being
carried out, will suffice to estal~lish involuntary servitude. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S.
4 (1944) (threat of imprisonment); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (same).
101. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. at 24; Phoebe v. Jay, 1 111. (Bresse) 268 (1828).
102. The thirteenth amendment has not been interpreted to impose a subjective test for invol-
untariness, which would turn upon the mental state of the servitor alone. See United States v.
Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1964) (Dimock, J., concurring).
103. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. at 9 (quoting Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207,
215-16 (1905)).
104. 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
105. Defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1976), which makes it a crime to
"knowingly and willfully hold[ ] to involuntary servitude or sell[ ] into any condition of involuntary
servitude, any other person for any term, or bring[ ] within the United States any person so
held .... 333 F.2d at 476.
106. Id. at 480.
107. Id. at 487.
108. 443 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See also Burgess Bros. v.
Stewart, 112 Misc. 347, 184 N.Y.S. 199 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 194 App. Div. 913, 185 N.Y.S. 85
(1920) (injunction against unlawfully striking not involuntary servitude, because individual employees
were not forbidden to quit work, accept better employment, or change positions).
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did not establish an involuntary servitude, inasmuch as an employee constrained
by the system was free to abandon his profession as a baseball player and to
seek or accept other employment. Under Shackney and Flood, the threatened
loss of the license to practice law would not make acceptance of court appoint-
ments involuntary; an attorney remains free to abandon the practice of law with-
out risking imprisonment or bodily harm. Therefore, an attorney's compelled
representation of poor litigants cannot be characterized as an involuntary servi-
tude.
Even if denominated an involuntary servitude, an attorney's duty to serve
court-assigned clients probably falls within the "public service" exception to the
thirteenth amendment. Under this exception,' 9 the government may compel
citizens to render a public service, even when the compulsion amounts to in-
voluntary servitude. Thus in the Selective Draft Law Cases "I the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that the thirteenth amendment was not intended "to destroy the power
of the Government to compel a citizen to render public service." On this theory,
the Court has upheld military conscription,"' the incarceration of material
witnesses,"' a Florida statute requiring able-bodied men to labor on public roads
without compensation," 3 and a Michigan statute forbidding public officers to re-
linquish their positions without the consent of the state."' This exception to the
prohibition of involuntary servitude would allow a state to demand virtually any
public service of its citizens, although the scope of "public service" may be
reasonably limited to services in areas of traditional concern to the state." ' The
state could thereby compel its residents to serve in such areas as police protec-
tion, sanitation, public health, and education, but perhaps not in the commercial
realm."16
109. A servitude that otherwise would be precluded by the thirteenth amendment may be per-
missible under one other exception. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), held that "services
which have from time immemorial been treated as exceptional" will not be affected by the thirteenth
amendment prohibition. Id. at 282. In that case a statute authorizing justices of the peace to
apprehend deserted seamen and return them to their vessel was upheld as such a historical exception.
See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The obligation of
attorneys to serve upon court assignment, particularly in civil cases, lacks the historical foundation to
come under the Robertson exception. But see Act for the Regulation of Attorneys, Act LXI of
1642-43, 1 Hening Statutes at Large of Virginia 275-76 (forbidding a licensed attorney to refuse to
be retained unless already retained on the other side of the controversy).
110. 245 U.S. 366, 373 (1917).
111. Id.
112. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973).
113. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916).
114. Edwards v. United States, 103 U.S. 471, 473-74 (1880).
115. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (defining"activities ... typical of those performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual
functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services" [footnote omitted]). But see
Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 351 (1917) (suggesting that the state possibly is not prohibited from
requiring private employees to work).
116. In Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966), the Second Circuit suggested that the
power of the government to compel personal service may also be limited by a requirement of reason-
able necessity. In Jobson an inmate of a mental institution claimed that the institution's mandatory
work program imposed an involuntary servitude. The court acknowledged that the compulsory com-
mission of the mentally ill represented an exception to the thirteenth amendment prohibition, because
such individuals may be harmful to themselves or to society if allowed to remain at large. The court
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The Supreme Court has made clear that it regards representation of indi-
gents by court-appointed attorneys, at least in criminal cases, to be the perform-
ance of a public service." 7  It has been argued that the representation of civil
litigants, on the other hand, entails only a private service. Proponents of this
position point to the public values at issue in criminal proceedings as opposed to
the private rights pressed in civil suits, and note that the states are under no
obligation to provide counsel to civil litigants comparable to their constitutional
mandate to provide legal assistance to indigent criminal defendants. "' But the
state interest necessary to justify compulsion of public service need not be of
constitutional dimension." '9 Regardless of the nature of the case, the substantial
state interest in assuring fairness in the administration of justice 120 would justify
the states in providing legal assistance to litigants. 2 The existence of state and
federally funded programs to provide legal assistance to the poor in civil cases "2
affirms that such assistance serves a public purpose. If it did not, such expendi-
tures would be improper exercises of governmental spending powers.,2
held, however, that the scope of their servitude could not exceed the societal interests that make the
incarceration necessary. Although work that was reasonably related to a therapeutic program or nor-
mal housekeeping chores would fall within the confines of the exception, mandatory programs devoid
of therapeutic purpose, because of the amount of work demanded or the conditions under which the
work was performed, would be unconstitutional as an involuntary servitude. Jobson suggests that the
state should not be permitted to disregard the personal liberty and integrity of its citizens by making
demands upon their services unrelated to the attainment of the state interest.
117. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973) (citing United States v. Dillon,
346 F.2d 633, 635 (1965)). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
118. See New York City Bar Proposal, supra note 22, at 57. However, the duty of attorneys to
serve under appointment arose well before the Supreme Court recognized an indigent accused's
constitutional right to counsel in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). As a result, appointment
of counsel in criminal cases conventionally has not turned upon the existence of the defendant's
constitutional right to be provided counsel. See, e.g., People v. Monahan, 17 N.Y.2d 310, 313, 270
N.Y.S.2d 613, 615, 217 N.E.2d 664, 666 (1966) (inherent power to assign counsel to indigent
defendants extends to coram nobis proceedings).
119. For example, the state's power to require its citizens to labor on the public roads, upheld
in Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916), was not premised on the state's constitutional obligation to
build roads.
120. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). The layman's inability to
overcome the intricacy of the adjudicative process, which gives rise to a constitutional guarantee of
counsel in criminal prosecutions, equally impedes effective access of uncounselled litigants to the
judicial process in civil cases. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970); Caston v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977). Because states hold a monopoly over tech-
niques of dispute settlement in certain civil cases, the states are forbidden in such instances to impose
court fees that have the effect of denying indigents access to the courts. See Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce decrees). A state may reasonably determine that adjudicative complex-
ity, although not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, impedes the access of uncounselled
indigents to expeditious resolution of civil disputes. The resultant state interest in providing attorneys
to impecunious litigants in civil suits will not be diminished in the case of a plaintiff who voluntarily
comes into court, inasmuch as his inability to redress an injury causes an involuntary loss equal to
that of a civil defendant who is unable effectively to protect his interests in court. See Schlagenhauf
v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964).
121. An affirmative finding that assistance of counsel will advance the fairness of the proceed-
ing might be necessary, at least in civil cases, to ensure the applicability of the public service
exception. See note 116 supra.
122. See note 18 supra.
123. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
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C. Uncompensated Taking of Private Property
The fifth amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 124 The principle behind this restriction
is that the government may not require a small number of individuals to bear
costs that properly ought to be assumed by the public as a whole.' z  Although
this principle antedates the Constitution,'" no clear-cut test has yet been formu-
lated to determine whether government action affecting private property is a
compensable taking. 127 Once it is shown that government action interferes with
interests in private property '1 without the claimant's consent," courts undertake
an ad hoc consideration of factors that have traditionally been deemed relevant to
the takings question.' 30
For example, a court is most likely to require compensation when govern-
ment interference with property can be characterized as a "physical invasion" or
an "acquisition[ ] of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public
functions." '31 When the government does not affirmatively acquire property,
124. U.S. Const. amend. V. The takings clause has been made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment. Chicago B. & Q.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
125. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
126. See, 2 S. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations 829-30 (1729):
[W]hen Contributions are to be made for the Preservation of some particular Thing, by
Persons that enjoy it in common, every Man should pay his Quota, and one should not be
forced to bear more of the Burthen than another .... [Blut because the State of a Com-
monwealth may often be such ... that the Publick may be forced to want the use of
something in the Possession of some private Subject; it must be allowed that the Sovereign
Power may sieze upon it, to answer the Necessities of the State. But then, all above the
Proportion that was due from the Proprietors, is to be refunded to them by the rest of the
Subjects.
127. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
128. Decisions rejecting "takings" challenges on the basis that no "property" had been inter-
fered with have generally held that despite economic harm from government action, the claimant's
interests were not sufficiently bound up with reasonable proprietary expectations. See, e.g., United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
129. See, e.g., Kunhardt & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 537, 540 (1925) (no "taking" of
vessel when in order to comply with the demands of government officials that it deliver goods in
accordance with its sales contract, claimant was forced to forego a profitable disposition of a vessel it
owned).
The rationale that "takings" to which the claimant has consented require no compensation has
been applied to deny compensation "for the performance of a public duty [that the Government] is
already owed." Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973) (citing Monongahela Bridge
Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 193 (1910) (modification of bridge to prevent obstruction of
navigation); United States v. Hobbs, 450 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1971) (military conscription);
Roodenko v. United States, 147 F.2d 752, 754 (10th Cir. 1944) (alternative service of conscientious
objectors)). The idea that consent vitiates a "taking" has also been applied when an owner took his
property with notice that it was subject to the challenged government interference. See, e.g., HFH,
Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 521, 542 P.2d 237, 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 374 (1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (land investors on notice that environmental controls might be im-
posed). The property owner's ability to anticipate his loss traditionally excused the sovereign from
the duty to compensate seizures of private property for the public benefit. See, 2 S. Pufendorf, supra
note 126, at 830.
130. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
131. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 128 (1978) (citing United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (direct overflights that destroyed the present use of claimant's
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but instead lowers the value of property by prohibiting particular present or con-
templated uses, so as to frustrate investment-backed expectations, compensation
may also be required 3 2 However, restrictions on the use of property often need
not be compensated, on the theory that the claimant retained a reciprocal
benefit,"' that the restriction did not have an unduly harsh impact,'" or that the
desired use of property would destroy or be inconsistent with the use of neigh-
boring properties. 35
A number of courts have held that the takings clause compels the govern-
ment to compensate attorneys appointed to represent indigent litigants.'36 In con-
sidering whether governmental appropriation of personal services requires just
compensation, courts must confront two questions. The first is whether personal
services are "property" protected by the fifth amendment's takings clause.
Second, courts must determine whether the government's appropriation of the
particular services in question requires compensation under traditional ad hoc
takings analysis.
Supreme Court precedent offers little guidance on these questions. Although
the Court has twice faced challenges to the appropriation of personal services, in
each case the Court avoided these questions. In Butler v. Perry,3 7 the Court
concluded that even if personal labor can be considered "property" for purposes
of the takings provision, compelled labor on the public roads would not be com-
pensable. The Court found the takings clause subordinate to the power of the
government since colonial days to conscript labor for the construction and
land as chicken farm); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (overflights); Portsmouth
Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (repeated firing of guns over claimant's land); United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (flooding of land)). See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
In characterizing government action, "takings" jurisprudence does not divide a particular prop.
erty into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated, but rather focuses on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
property as a whole. As a result, laws that impose a servitude by restricting the development of air
rights or prohibiting the subjacent or lateral development of particular parcels have not been
characterized as a physical acquisition of air, subjacent, or lateral rights. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909)).
132. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355
(1908).
133. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131-35 (1978). The
principle that no taking is effected when burdens and benefits are allocated nondiscriminatorily has
been advanced to justify historic-district legislation and zoning laws. Id. at 132; id. at 139-40
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also 2 S. Pufendorf, supra note 126, at 830 (compensation is to be
denied "where the Necessity was universal, and every Subject suffer'd equal Loss").
134. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
135. See, e.g., id.; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915).
A use restriction will constitute a taking, however, where not reasonably related to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. See, e.g., Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526,
530-31 (1917); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905).
136. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
137. 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916).
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maintenance of roads. 38  Similarly, in Hurtado v. United States 39 an indi-
vidual's donation of personal services was found to be a "public duty," which
was not compensable under the takings clause. Hurtado rejected a challenge to
the incarceration of material witnesses. The Court held that giving evidence at
trial is a traditional public obligation owed by every person within the govern-
ment's jurisdiction.'"
Although the Supreme Court has not clearly determined that personal serv-
ices are property for the purposes of the takings clause, there is much support
for that conclusion. The courts have not limited the application of the takings
clause to tangible property.' 4' Arguments that the only intangibles protected by
the takings clause are those related to physical items have been accepted by a
few courts." The lower courts, however, generally consider an affirmative use
of the time, experience, and skill of a professional to be "property" that is
"taken" when services are compelled, because these attributes make up a pro-
fessional's stock in trade.' 3 Courts have also analogized professional services to
the work-product of an inventor'4" or laborer, 4 which traditionally are compen-
138. See also Sawyer v. City of Alton, 4 I11. (3 Scam.) 127 (1840); In re Dassler, 35 Kan.
678, 12 P. 130 (1886); State v. Comm'rs of Halifax, 15 N.C. 295 (1833); State v. Wheeler, 141
N.C. 773, 53 S.E. 358 (1906); Dennis v. Simon, 51 Ohio St. 233, 36 N.E. 832 (1894); State v.
Raybum, 2 Okla. Crim. 413, 101 P. 1029 (1909).
139. 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973).
140. See also United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 1967)
(response to summons of documents relevant to a lawful investigation is a public duty, and financial
burden is not a taking without just compensation).
141. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & N.R.R., 223 U.S. 390 (1912) (chose in
action); United States v. Bums, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246 (1870) (patent rights); City of Thibodaux v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 126 So. 2d 24 (La. Ct. App. 1926) (franchise).
142. In Gardner v. United States, 446 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1971), the court denied a takings
claim for lost earnings caused by false imprisonment. Although the government in that case could not
be said to have affirmatively appropriated his services, it did bar the claimant from acquiring prop-
erty through the use of his services. In rejecting the claim, the court indicated that the fifth amend-
ment right to recover compensation for property taken for public use is "confined to a taking of an
interest in property which the Supreme Court has defined as 'the group of rights inhering in the
citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.' " Id. at 1197
(citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
It may also be argued that the right to one's own services constitutes a "liberty" interest under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, excluded by expressio unius from "property" under
the due process clause, and thus, by analogy, from "property" under the takings clause of the same
amendment. Cf. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 630 (1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("property"
in the due process clause "embraces all valuable interests which a man may possess outside of...
his life and liberty"). However, the ambit of "property" within the takings and due process
clauses need not be coextensive. Moreover, courts have increasingly come to regard the right to labor
as property within the meaning of the due process clause. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 492 (1959). See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Howe, 26 F. Cas. 394 (W.D. Ark. 1881) (No. 15404a);
Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 346, 148 S.E.2d 143, 145, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1978 (1966); Mount v. Welsh, 118 Or. 568, 585, 247 P. 815, 821 (1926); Pruden v. Grant County,
12 Or. 308, 7 P. 308 (1885); cases cited at note 150 infra. An analogy of personal labor to property
is embedded in natural law .principles that antecede the Constitution. See 2 S. Pufendorf, supra note
126, at 498.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552 (1895); United
States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888).
145. Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialmen's liens deemed com-
pensable property under the fifth amendment, suggesting that laborer's liens equally would be com-
pensable).
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
sable under the takings clause.1'4 Thus, the exercise of the state's power to com-
pel personal service 47 may give rise to a right to compensation, in the same way
that a right to compensation is created by the exercise of the state's power of
eminent domain. 4 For example, courts may require the appearance of a disin-
terested expert witness, because his testimony would provide a public service.1' 9
But if a court chooses to summon an expert witness, the expert's services must
be compensated under the fifth amendment, because they are not a previously
owed public duty.1" Once personal services are acknowledged to be property,
the more complex task remains to adapt traditional takings analysis to cases of
government interference with the private allocation of personal services.
The distinction between compensable "takings" and noncompensable "reg-
ulations" may be applied to interference with labor.' For instance, criminal
prohibitions of such acts as theft or assault, or civil wage and hour limitations,
are not "takings" but "regulations," which restrict socially undesireable uses of
one's services.' On the other hand, the requirement in Butler that able-bodied
men work on the public roads or the obligation of attorneys to represent indi-
gents at trial constitute an affirmative appropriation of property of the type that
traditionally compels compensation.'
146. See Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487, 491-92 (D. Or. 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d
633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
147. There are numerous traditional public services which may be compelled by the state.
These include acceptance of municipal office, see Edwards v. United States, 103 U.S. 471 (1880);
People v. Williams, 145 Ill. 573, 33 N.E. 849 (1893), the duty of witnesses to attend court and
testify, see Ex parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389 (1875); Bennett v. Kroth, 37 Kan. 235, 15 P. 221 (1887);
Henley v. State, 98 Tenn. 665, 41 S.W. 352 (1897), and service as a juror, Neely v. State, 63
Tenn. (4 Baxt.) 174 (1874). See text accompanying notes 109-16 supra. See generally I P. Nichols,
The Law of Eminent Domain § 1.4[3] (3d rev. ed. 1980).
148. It has been suggested that the thirteenth amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude
precludes a taking of personal services on the theory of eminent domain. See I P. Nichols, The Law
of Eminent Domain § 2.1[5] (3d rev. ed. 1980). Clearly, a state cannot compel a service merely
because it would promote public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. At the other extreme,
Hurtado and Butler affirm that the state need provide no compensation for the exercise of a duty
owed as an incident of residence within the jurisdiction. It seems likely, however, that the state may
also require public service that is not traditionally regarded as a public duty, and such services could
require compensation under the takings clause.
149. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 929 (1973); Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941). See
also text accompanying notes 109-16 supra.
150. While an expert, like an ordinary witness, may be required to appear at trial and provide
impromptu answers to questions put before him, courts have generally been held unable to require an
expert witness to conduct examinations or prepare himself for trial without compensation. See
Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941); Flinn v. Prairie County,
60 Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459 (1895); Bradley v. Davidson, 47 App. D.C. 266, 285 (1918); Dixon v.
People, 168 I11. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Stevens v. Worcester, 196 Mass. 45, 56, 81 N.E. 907,
910 (1907); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2203(2)(c) (McNaughton rev. ed. 1960); 4 Moore's Federal
Practice 26.66[1] (2d ed. 1979).
151. See notes 131-32 and accompanying text supra.
152. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Local Union No. 11, IBEW v. Boldt,
481 F.2d 1392, 1395 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092 (1973) (wage freezes).
153. The requirement that an individual labor on behalf of the public would seem best
characterized as a temporary appropriation and use of personal services. See note 131 and accom-
panying text supra. It may nevertheless be argued that the alternative civil sanction results in the
establishment of a "use restriction" rather than a physical acquisition of property, because the indi-
[Vol. 81:366
UNCOMPENSATED ASSISTANCE
The substantial public purpose promoted by the services appropriated in
such cases as Butler and Hurtado would not in itself have been enough to justify
a denial of compensation, in the absence of an historical obligation that sup-
planted the fifth amendment. 54 The appropriation of services in either case,
however, could have been justified under traditional takings analysis, even
though government actions involved an affirmative acquisition of property, rather
than a restriction of undesirable uses. In each case the burdens and benefits of
the appropriated services were equitably distributed; there was "an average
reciprocity of advantage." "I The road labor exacted in Butler furthered a legiti-
mate public interest in transportation, and all who labored would ultimately ben-
efit from access to the roads; the work was divided evenly among members of
the public, rather than allocated to a select class; and the six days of work
demanded each year did not substantially frustrate any individual's economic
interest in his own labor. Similarly, the requirement in Hurtado that residents
appear as witnesses for negligible compensation promoted the public interest in
the administration of justice, and gave rise to a reciprocal right to call upon
others to appear as witnesses in one's own trial. Furthermore, the obligation fell
equally upon all residents and did not create an excessive economic hardship.
In contrast, in cases of disinterested expert witnesses compelled to testify at
trial, there is no reciprocal benefit to offset the burden imposed. The obligation
does not fall equally on all citizens, but applies only to a select segment of
society. Moreover, the professional suffers the frustration of economic expecta-
tions derived from his or her prior investment in special education and
training.' 56  Therefore, an appropriation of personal services of this kind,
directed at a particular class of professionals, would require compensation under
an ad hoc takings approach. 57
vidual is "restricted" from rendering particular services absent a corresponding willingness to donate
his labor. However, a restriction imposed as a coercive device by the government in order to acquire
property cannot properly be deemed a regulation when the limitation is placed upon a desirable,
rather than an undesirable, use of property. See note 135 and accompanying text supra. See also Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 38 (1964). When the state requires that a profes-
sional donate services as a condition of his right to render identical services for compensation, it
acknowledges that those services are socially beneficial, and therefore not legitimately prohibited as
an exercise of the power to regulate for the public welfare.
154. Although a considerable number of takings cases deny compensation largely on the ground
of the extent of the public purpose served by challenged government action, these cases generally
consider action in the nature of a restriction on the use of property. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978). The distinction between affirmative appropriations
and prohibitions that affect economic values may be rationalized on the basis that in the former cases
the government acts in an enterprise capacity appropriating property for a strictly governmental pur-
pose, while in the latter case, the government simple arbitrates between conflicting private uses. See
id. at 135 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)); L. Tribe, supra note 82, § 9-5, at
464 & n.8. Were the mere presence of a legitimate purpose sufficient in itself to deny compensation,
little if any force would remain to the guarantee of just compensation, inasmuch as any government
interference with property is required to serve a public purpose. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
155. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (opinion of Holmes, J.).
156. Investment-backed expectations will be frustrated to a lesser degree, however, when the
state previously subsidized the cost of an individual's professional education.
157. The case in which an individual is called upon to render professional services incidental to
the fulfillment of a military obligation can be distinguished. In such a case the obligation to serve is
spread out among the citizenry.
19811
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
An attorney's state-imposed obligation to represent the poor is an affirma-
tive acquisition of services directed at a select class of professionals. As such, it
is the type of government interference with property that ordinarily would have
to be compensated, in accordance with the general principle that select indi-
viduals ought not be compelled to assume costly public burdens. In the case of
court-appointed attorneys, however, the burdens and benefits of service are
equitably distributed; attorneys enjoy reciprocal advantages from the state that
justify a denial of compensation under the takings clause.
Although the license to practice law no longer carries with it such privileges
as limited immunity to suit bestowed on practitioners in seventeenth-century
England,'58 the license conveys benefits of great value to attorneys. Through the
exercise of its licensing authority to exclude unqualified individuals from the
practice of law, the state grants attorneys a monopoly to practice law. The eco-
nomic benefit of this monopoly offsets the burden of accepting court
appointments.' 59  Like many other occupational groups, lawyers are permitted
wide latitude in establishing eligibility requirements for professional practice,
with the exclusion of individuals from practice enforced by the police power of
the state.
The enjoyment of a monopoly does not in itself distinguish attorneys from
nurses, teachers, insurance agents, brokers, pharmacists, and other groups sub-
ject to state licensing or regulatory authority." ° However, the proportionately
higher entrance requirement for the legal profession and the great number of
tasks relegated by law to attorneys in the United States, although the same tasks
could be performed satisfactorily by laymen with lesser qualifications, results in
a significantly greater economic benefit to attorneys. 6'
158. See note 60 supra.
159. Courts have held in several instances that a government-granted monopoly justifies the
imposition of reciprocal financial burdens than otherwise might be compensable. For example, in
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914'
(1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the New York Court of Appeals denied compensation for profits
lost by Penn Central as a result of the city's designation of Grand Central Terminal as a "land-
mark." The court stressed that much of the value of the terminal resulted from a history of govern-
ment assistance to the railroad, noting that "railroads have always been a franchised and regulated
public utility, favored monopolies at public expense, subsidy, and with limited powers of eminent
domain, without which their existence and character would not have been possible." Id. at 332, 366
N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (citation omitted). The court concluded that "[a] fair return
[on its investment] is to be accorded the owner [of the Terminal], but society is to receive its due for
its share in the making of a once great railroad." Id. at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
919. See also Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267 U.S. 330 (1925); People ex rel.
New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345 (1917); Western Union Tel. Co. v. City of
Richmond, 224 U.S. 160 (1912); cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-92,
396-401 (1969) (requirement that broadcast media yield reply time is reciprocal to its license to use
scarce broadcasting frequencies).
160. In virtually all cases of occupational licensing in the United States, licensing legislation
provides a recognizable economic benefit to occupational groups. As a result, licensing has rarely
been a response to pressure to protect the public from unqualified practitioners. Most often, licensing
has been a response to pressure from the occupational group seeking a monopoly over a particular
area of work. See generally B. Shimberg, B. Esser & D. Cruger, Occupational Licensing: Practices
and Policies (1973); W. Gellhorn, Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints 105-151 (1956).
161. Statutes that proscribe unlawful practice of law generally define the practice of law to
include advocacy on behalf of others before judicial or administrative bodies, giving advice on legal
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Attorneys also enjoy a state-conferred benefit far beyond their monopoly
position, because the demand for their services is largely a product of the state
regulatory mechanism. Many services that in other countries are provided by the
state are performed by lawyers in the United States.' The government's estab-
lishment of legal controls over the private sector creates an additional need for
lawyers.63
Finally, the attorney's role as advocate is almost entirely a creation of the
state. And at least in the civil area, states have considerable power to expand or
limit that role."6' As a result, the economic benefit that flows from the attor-
ney's right to represent others at adjudicative proceedings is directly related to
the burden imposed on attorneys in representing the poor without compensation.
Absent the willingness of attorneys to accept civil appointments, states wishing
to provide indigents equal access to the legal process might be compelled to
establish a less complicated means of adjudication,161 so that litigants would need
no special expertise in order to safeguard their own interests.'6 A requirement
problems, and drafting legal instruments. See, e.g., N.Y. Jud. Law §§ 478-481, 484 (McKinney
Supp. 1970). Particularly in the areas of giving advice and drafting or preparing instruments, many
tasks are relegated exclusively to lawyers that reasonably could be performed by individuals in other
professions. Yet statutes barring the unlawful practice of law are invoked to limit the services pro-
vided by such groups as accountants, see, e.g., In re Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209
(1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949) (advice as to tax liability), trust companies, see,
e.g., Frazer v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1964) (drafting wills),
banks and insurance companies, see, e.g., Green v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 4 Ohio St. 2d 78, 212
N.E.2d 585 (1965) (estate planning), drafting and abstract companies, see, e.g., Beach Abstract &
Guaranty Co. v. Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326 S.W.2d 900 (1959) (drafting and title
examination), realtors, see, e.g., State v. Bender, 106 N.J. Super. 196, 254 A.2d 552 (1969) (prepa-
ration of instruments), and surveyors, see, e.g., In re Welch, 123 Vt. 180, 185 A.2d 458 (1962)
(preparation of instruments).
162. The lawyer in Europe, by comparison, performs a far narrower function:
In France and to a lesser degree in Britain a large number of functions relating to the
lives of individuals, including many matters having to do with birth, inheritance, death,
divorce, etc., are not necessarily carried out by lawyers. The state, through a series of
regulations and administrative decisions, as well as administrative organizations, readily
handles these simple functions in a way that minimizes or eliminates the need for lawyers
at each step of the way .... [T]he kind of legal work [performed by most lawyers in the
United States]-accident work, wills, divorce cases, etc.- . . . [is] absorb[ed] and
define[d] as administrative routine rather than arbitrative or needing legal advocates, courts,
or people functioning on any advocate capacity whatsoever.
E. Krause, The Sociology of Occupations 165-66 (1971).
163. In contrast, regulation of the banking community, the insurance industry, and the stock
exchange is accomplished in England largely by negotiation and by moral pressure. As a result, this
aspect of the function performed by American lawyers is performed by others in England. B. Abel-
Smith & R. Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts 1 (1967).
164. The fifth and sixth amendments largely circumscribe the process by which the state may
mete out punishment for criminal acts; in the absence of these limits, the states have considerable
latitude in establishing a system for resolving civil disputes. See L. Tribe, supra note 82, § 16-11, at
1008.
165. Puritan Massachusetts provided an example of an elaborate and relatively comprehensive
judicial system, which functioned effectively without lawyers, yet afforded its citizens such rights as
notice, hearing, trial and appeal. See G. Hasbins, Law and Authority in Early Massachusetts 25-42
(1960).
166. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-88 (1973) (parole revocation proceedings
generally provide sufficient protection against wrongful deprivation without incurring cost of provid-
ing counsel to parolees, because of the informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of tech-
nical rules of evidence).
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that attorneys donate their services at the request of the court is related to the
benefit enjoyed by attorneys as advocates-the opportunity to obtain a fee from
clients who are unable to represent themselves but can afford to retain counsel to
represent them in the resolution of civil disputes.167
CONCLUSION
Prudential concern for minimizing the burden upon members of the legal
profession militates for judicious use by courts of their authority to compel attor-
neys to represent indigent litigants in civil cases. Although exercises of this
authority are not immune from constitutional scrutiny, neither are they unconsti-
tutional. Appointment of attorneys to represent litigants in civil cases does not
violate due process. The thirteenth amendment prohibition of involuntary servi-
tude does not limit government authority to compel public services of this na-
ture. Moreover, the absence of compensation for legal assistance rendered upon
court appointment does not contravene the takings clause because of the recip-
rocal economic benefit granted attorneys by virtue of their monopoly of practice
in the state-created adjudicative system.
Bruce Andrew Green
167. In individual cases the extent of the financial cost of accepting a court appointment may be
extreme enough to justify compensation, on the theory that the burden far outweighed any possible
benefit from the license to practice law. Courts rejecting constitutional challenges to court appoint-
ments have conceded that the requirement may be unconstitutional in particular cases, See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1976); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph,
35 IlL. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966). But see Wright v. Louisiana, 362 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1966).
